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Abstract
A fundamental requirement for the healthcare industry is that the delivery of
care comes rst and nothing should interfere with it. As a consequence, the
access control mechanisms used in healthcare to regulate and restrict the dis-
closure of data are often bypassed in case of emergencies. This phenomenon,
called \break the glass", is a common pattern in healthcare organizations and,
though quite useful and mandatory in emergency situations, from a security
perspective, it represents a serious system weakness. Malicious users, in fact,
can abuse the system by exploiting the break the glass principle to gain unau-
thorized privileges and accesses.
In this paper, we propose an access control solution aimed at better regulat-
ing break the glass exceptions that occur in healthcare systems. Our solution
is based on the denition of dierent policy spaces, a language, and a compo-
sition algebra to regulate access to patient data and to balance the rigorous
nature of traditional access control systems with the \delivery of care comes
rst" principle.
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1. Introduction
Healthcare systems support interactions among patients, medical practition-
ers, insurance companies, and pharmacies. The very sensitive nature of the
information managed by these systems requires the balance between two con-
trasting needs: the need for data, to guarantee proper delivery of care; and the
need for keeping data secure, to properly protect the privacy of patients. Ac-
cess control is the base mechanism that healthcare systems adopt for protecting
medical data. Traditional access control models and policies are based on the
assumption that possible access requests that will have to be obeyed are known
in advance and can therefore be captured by authorizations. However, since in
healthcare systems an important requirement is that \nothing interferes with
the delivery of care" [2], access control restrictions may need to be bypassed in
case of emergencies, especially when the patient's life is at risk. For instance, in
case of emergency, a nurse may require (and should be granted) access to data
that under \normal" conditions she cannot view. This phenomenon is usually
referred to as \break the glass". While useful and mandatory in the name of
care delivery, the break the glass can represent a weakness for the security of
the system, since allowing it in an unconditional or uncontrolled manner can
easily open the door to abuses [3]. To limit (or prevent) such abuses the access
control system should minimize the cases in which no regulation applies and
the break the glass principle is enforced. An access control system designed to
operate in the healthcare scenario should also be exible and extensible (i.e.,
it should not be limited to a particular model or language), should protect the
privacy of the patients, and should not allow exchange of identity data, in com-
pliance with government legislations (e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act [4] in the United States).
In this paper, we address the need for a exible and powerful access con-
trol system for the healthcare scenario by proposing a model that attempts to
balance, on one hand, the rigorous nature of access control models and, on the
other hand, the priority of care delivery in healthcare scenarios. We introduce
the concept of policy space and we describe how policies, which regulate access
to medical data, are specied and enforced within each space and how their
composition works. Our proposal is aimed at limiting accesses that break the
glass, by classifying (a subset of) these access requests as abuses or planned ex-
ceptions and by dening specic policies regulating them. In [1], we presented
an early version of our proposal that here is extended to the consideration of
context information, to allow environment factors to inuence how and when
a policy is enforced. With respect to the original paper, we also introduce an
algebra for combining policies within spaces.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
requirements of an access control system in the healthcare scenario. Section 3
introduces our assumptions and an illustrative use case. Section 4 denes policy
spaces for the management of exceptions. Section 5 denes our language in terms
of authorizations, policies, and composition algebra. Section 6 illustrates how
the policies are dened in the dierent spaces. Section 7 describes the policy
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evaluation and enforcement. Section 8 discusses related work. Finally, Section 9
presents our concluding remarks.
2. Requirements for Access Control in Healthcare
The design of a comprehensive solution for protecting personal health infor-
mation should incorporate the specic security, privacy, and integrity require-
ments arising in a healthcare scenario [5]. In the following, we consider three
main categories of requirements: i) healthcare professional and patient require-
ments, ii) policy and model requirements, and iii) implementation requirements.
Healthcare professional and patient requirements. Medical information is one of
the most sensitive classes of information whose condentiality and integrity is
fundamental. Medical information should then be accessible only to the au-
thorized healthcare professionals and patients. In particular, among healthcare
professionals, the physician in charge of the patient's care and treatments is
usually responsible for the use of the patient's information (care stewardship).
Patients should be able to access their information and to maintain the con-
trol over who can access it by means of a proper notication mechanism, prior
approval, and explicit consent. Since patient's health is more important than
data condentiality and integrity, the principle of delivery of Care Comes First
(CCF) must be enforced. The main consequence of this principle is that, in
case of emergencies, the medical information of a patient should be accessible
to whom is able to deliver care to the patient, even if she is not explicitly autho-
rized. In these situations, access control policies may be overridden. To prevent
or discover possible abuses via a post-analysis, every access granted must be
recorded in association with the identity of the subject accessing the system.
Policy and model requirements. Since in the healthcare scenario the privileges
of subjects often depend on their role (e.g., nurse, doctor, patient), an access
control model should support both the denition of authorizations for subjects
that can be hierarchically organized in groups and the denition of a hierar-
chy of roles. Also, access control models and policies for healthcare systems
should support the hierarchical organization of the information to facilitate the
denition of authorizations.
Access control decisions may often depend on the information stored for the
involved patient, which includes dierent kinds of data with dierent protec-
tion requirements. As a consequence, a ne-grained access control that veries
whether or not to permit access to health information on an attribute/property
basis is important. The support for context information that triggers the acti-
vation of (dynamic) policies is also of paramount importance. In fact, an access
control decision may depend on a set of environment factors that inuence how
and when a policy is enforced. For instance, under normal circumstances the
health information of patients stored in the database of a hospital can be ac-
cessed only locally, in the event of an epidemic or of a natural disaster (e.g., a
hurricane), physicians working remotely can access patient information to treat
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victims. Although in emergency situations policies that apply in normal cir-
cumstances can be overridden, there are some accesses that should always be
prevented, since they cannot help in managing such emergency situations and
represent abuses. Such accesses should never be permitted, meaning that policy
override must be denied.
Implementation requirements. The policy and model requirements inuence the
way in which access control systems should be implemented. In particular, to
guarantee the enforcement of the CCF principle, it is necessary to provide a way
for bypassing the access control mechanisms. This phenomenon is usually called
break the glass or BtG for short. Every access must be logged to take a-posteriori
decisions on the accesses and eventually take countermeasures in case of misuses.
To this purpose, an authentication mechanism that veries the identity claimed
by the user accessing the system (especially during an emergency) as well as an
auditing mechanism that analyzes security logs must be implemented.
3. System Assumptions
We assume a closed world scenario involving a healthcare provider (e.g., a
hospital), where system users (e.g., doctors, nurses, and patients) are known,
meaning that their information is available at access request. In addition
to the user id , which uniquely identies each user in the system, we as-
sume that users are associated with proles that contain pairs of the form
hattribute name,attribute valuei representing their properties. Such a user-
related information is both static (i.e., it does not change or does not change
frequently such as, name, address, and date of birth) and dynamic (i.e., it may
depend on the specic user session) in nature. For instance, in healthcare sys-
tems based on a role-based access control model [6], the roles activated during a
user session are an example of dynamic information that is stored within the cor-
responding user's prole. Another attribute representing dynamic information
associated with a patient could indicate that a hearth attack is ongoing.
We refer to the medical data to be protected (i.e., the objects of the access
control policies) as datasets. Each dataset is characterized by a unique object
identier . Datasets can be organized in classes containing groups of datasets
that can be collectively referred with a given name and are associated with an
object prole (metadata) that provides additional information. Single attributes
appearing in user and object proles are referenced via the usual dot notation.
For instance, Alice.Address denotes attribute Address of user with id Alice.
We consider an access control system that protects medical datasets based
on policies that are modeled as a set of authorizations stating who can or cannot
execute which action on which resource. Policies can be further combined to
dene complex policies regulating access to resources.
In our model, the context information needed to trigger the activation of
(dynamic) policies (Section 2) is represented as a set E of pairs of the form
hattribute name,attribute valuei, which describes the state of the system at a
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(a) Traditional solutions (b) Our solution
Figure 1: Access control for the healthcare scenario
given time and is subject to frequent changes. Indeed, any event could pos-
sibly cause a modication of the state of the system and therefore of the set
E of attributes. By checking the values of the attributes in E, it is possi-
ble to recognize emergency situations. For instance, the presence of the pair
hcatastrophe,earthquakei in E means that an earthquake has just happened
and that the hospital must be ready to give aid to survivors. It is important to
note that E contains only environmental information not related to a specic
patient.
In the remainder of the paper, we refer our examples to a ctitious Mount
Cedar (MC) Hospital described below.
Example 3.1. The Mount Cedar (MC) Hospital is a children's hospital and
includes the following main actors:
• the children who need treatment;
• the children's relatives who are responsible for hospitalized children;
• the doctors who are responsible for providing care to children;
• the nurses who are responsible for helping the doctors;
• the social workers who are possibly responsible for helping the children in
case of trauma or abuses;
• the police men who are responsible for investigating and establishing possi-
ble criminal charges and responsibilities, in the cases of trauma or abuses.
4. Exception-Aware Policy Spaces for Healthcare
Access control systems tailored to the healthcare scenario are characterized,
as illustrated in Figure 1(a), by the presence of two policy spaces, namely P+
and EU . In general, a policy space can be dened as a policy repository, whose
policies regulate access to resources. Space P+ represents authorized accesses
and regulates common practice requests. If a request satises a policy in P+,
then it is permitted. Space EU represents unplanned exceptions and regulates
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all those requests for which policies in P+ are not applicable. In healthcare
scenario, since nothing should interfere with the delivery of care, space P+
may be bypassed, especially when a patient's life is at risk. In these emergency
situations, although the requester does not have the authorization to perform the
action requested (i.e., no policy in P+ applies), the request is always permitted
by the policies in EU , thus breaking the glass. This solution makes the system
vulnerable to malicious users that may exploit the BtG principle for breaching
the patient's privacy also when it is not strictly necessary.
To limit the possible abuses exploiting the BtG option, we put forward the
idea of dening a solution based on the following extended set of policy spaces
(see Figure 1(b)).
• Authorized Accesses (P+). Space P+ corresponds to traditional access
control policies. Intuitively, P+ includes positive authorizations regulating
`common practice'.
• Denied Accesses (P ). Space P  corresponds to access control policies
that are used to prevent abuses. Policies in this space are meant to limit
exceptions that can result in unauthorized accesses exploiting the BtG
option. As a consequence, they must be strictly enforced and do not allow
any exception. These policies reect actions that cannot help even in
emergency situations, but can only cause privacy breaches and must be
avoided. They can be specied a priori to eliminate accesses that should
never be authorized (i.e., accesses that should not be bypassed by BtG)
and/or inserted a posteriori because of observed abuses.
• Planned Exceptions (EP ). Space EP corresponds to policies regulating
access requests that do not fall into the normal routine, as well as activities
that should not be normally allowed. Policies in EP are associated with,
and indexed by, conditions on the context information represented by
attributes in E and on dynamic information in the proles (e.g., status
of the patient), which are used to restrict their applicability. Policies in
EP cannot override policies in P . Policies in EP regulate exceptions that
can be foreseen, for example, according to past observations.
• Unplanned Exceptions (EU ). Space EU corresponds to policies regulating
all access requests not covered by the previous policy spaces (P+;P ; and
EP ). Space EU is composed of two sub-spaces, denoted EU+ and EU  , re-
spectively. The applicability of the policies in these two subspaces strictly
depends on the state of the system (i.e., attributes in E) and on dynamic
information in the proles. Specically, EU  enforces the deny-all default
policy and is applicable to all requests that happen in non-emergency
cases, when the enforcement of the BtG principle would be an abuse.
Space EU+ enforces the permit-all default policy and is applicable to all
requests that happen in emergency situations, thus allowing all accesses
not explicitly allowed or denied by policies in other spaces. All the ac-
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cesses falling in EU are inserted into an auditing log for their a posteriori
analysis.
An important characteristic of these spaces is that they are not limited to a par-
ticular access control model, language, or implementation. As a consequence,
our solution allows the incorporation of the policy language that better suits the
requirements of each particular situation. The independence from the specic
language adopted allows backward compatibility of the policy space denitions,
meaning that our solution can immediately be integrated with existing access
control models with limited eort. Another advantage of our solution is that
policy spaces can be incrementally populated by analyzing accesses that are per-
mitted or denied by policies in EU+ and EU  , respectively, through an auditing
process. The auditing process can show access requests that: i) correspond to
common practice and should be explicitly permitted by appropriate policies in
P+; ii) should never be admitted and should be explicitly denied by dening
appropriate policies in P ; iii) are frequent but not common and should be
captured by appropriate exceptions in EP .
5. Authorization and Policy Denition
We present an access control model including authorization and policy de-
nition, and an algebra for composing them.
5.1. Authorization
Positive authorizations establish who can execute which action on which
resource [7]. In line with recent advancements, we allow the specication of
authorizations with reference to generic attributes/properties of the users (e.g.,
name, citizenship, occupation) and metadata (e.g., owner, creation date) of the
resources involved [8, 9, 10]. Authorizations are then specied over a set of
subjects and a set of objects, which are identied by a boolean formula dened
on their attributes [11], and are formally dened as follows.
Denition 5.1 (Authorization). An authorization is a quadruple of the form
[env condjsubject,object,action], where:
• env cond is a boolean formula that evaluates conditions on the context E
as well as on subject and object proles;
• subject is a boolean formula that can refer to a set of subjects depending
on whether they satisfy certain conditions evaluated on their proles (e.g.,
user's properties, user's membership in groups, active roles);
• object is a boolean formula that identies the set of objects to which the
authorization applies and that evaluates conditions over their proles;
• action is an action, or a set thereof, that subject is authorized to perform
on object.
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An authorization [env condjsubject,object,action] states that if env cond eval-
uates to true, subject is permitted to perform action on object. Conditions in
env cond are based on generic predicates that can evaluate attributes in E (e.g.,
the state of the application, the number of accesses to a given object, time/date)
and attributes in the subject and object proles (e.g., the status of the pa-
tient). To make it possible to refer to the subject or object of the request being
evaluated while avoiding the introduction of variables in the language, we use
keywords user and object in the denition of elements subject and object of
an authorization. Specically, keyword user refers to the user requesting ac-
cess and keyword object refers to the requested object. The appearances in
a conditional expression of user and object keywords are intended to be sub-
stituted with actual request parameters during the runtime evaluation of the
access control policy.
Syntactically, subject, object, and env cond are represented as boolean for-
mulas, composed of terms of the form \attribute op value", where op is a
generic operator dened on the domain of attribute. For instance, an autho-
rization stating that \a user with role doctor can read medical documents cre-
ated before year 2000 under any environment condition" can be expressed as:
[any juser.role=Doctor,object.creation date<2000/01/01,freadg].
The denition of restrictions on the environment in our model represents the
most important paradigm shift with respect to access control systems operating
in the healthcare scenario. Instead of being simply embedded in the denition
of the subject/object, environment condition env cond is dened as a separate
element in the authorizations. In the following, given an authorization A, nota-
tion A.env cond will be used to denote the environment condition characterizing
A.
5.2. Policy
Informally, a policy is a composition of a set (possibly singleton) of autho-
rizations. Moreover, policies and authorizations can be further combined using
a composition algebra. In the following, we introduce the three operators char-
acterizing our algebra [12].
• Addition (+). Binary operator + models the disjunction of two policies.
Given two policies P1 and P2, P1 + P2 means that an access is granted if at
least one of the policies is satised. For instance, if access to data of the pa-
tients should be authorized to the doctors or nurses responsible for them,
authorizations A1 = [anyjuser.role=Doctor, object.type=medical data
^ object.doctorId=user.id, freadg] and A2 = [anyjuser.role=Nurse,
object.type=medical data ^ object.nurseId=user.id, freadg] are com-
posed as P = A1 +A2.
• Conjunction (&). Binary operator & models the conjunction of two poli-
cies. Given two policies P1 and P2, P1 & P2 means that an access is
granted if both policies are satised. For instance, suppose that the
hospital species authorization A1 above, while patient P001 authorizes
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access to her medical data only to doctors with at least 10 years of
experience through A3 = [anyjuser.role=Doctor ^ user.experience>10,
object.type=medical data ^ object.patient=\P001", freadg], then the
two authorizations are composed as P = A1&A3.
• Subtraction ( ). Binary operator   models the case of a policy re-
stricted by another policy (exception). Given two policies P1 and P2,
P1   P2 restricts policy P1 to requests for which policy P2 is not sat-
ised. Access is then granted if P1 is satised and P2 is not. For in-
stance, if access to medical data is permitted to all nurses (A2) except for
those with less than 5 years of experience (A4 = [anyjuser.role=Nurse ^
user.experience<5,object.type=medical data,freadg]), then the two au-
thorizations are composed as P = A2  A4.
Based on the denitions of the algebraic operators described above, we dene
a policy expression as a composition of policies by using the following BNF
syntax:
policy expression ::= P j policy expression + policy expression j
j policy expression & policy expression j
j policy expression   policy expression.
where P is a policy.
We can now formally dene a policy as a composition of policies, associated
with an environment condition, as follows.
Denition 5.2 (Policy). A policy P is of the form
[env condjpolicy expression] such that if P1 : : : Pn are the policies in pol-
icy expression, then 8P i, with i=1: : :n, P i.env cond ! P .env cond.
The environment condition of a policy P , denoted P .env cond, must be
less restrictive than the environment conditions P1.env cond: : : Pn:env cond of
all the policies composing it (i.e., Pi.env cond ! P .env cond), meaning that
the satisfaction of any condition Pi:env cond, i = 1; : : : ; n, implies the sat-
isfaction of P .env cond while the vice versa is not true. For instance, pol-
icy P1=[catastrophe=`earthquake'jP1 + P2], where P1.env cond = (catastro-
phe=`earthquake' ^ criticality>5) and P2.env cond = (catastrophe=`earthquake'
^ criticality>7), is such that P1.env cond ! P .env cond and P2.env cond!
P .env cond.
Note that each policy space in our system is a composition of policies, using
the algebra described above. In the following, when clear from the context, we
will use the terms authorization and policy interchangeably.
6. Policy Space Languages
We now show how policies are dened in the dierent spaces.
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6.1. Policies for Spaces P+ and P 
Policies in P+ regulate normal accesses and correspond to positive autho-
rizations managed by traditional access control systems. For instance, an au-
thorization can state that a user can access the medical data of her patients
when she activates the Doctor or Nurse role.
Policies in space P , instead, regulate accesses to be denied. They are used
to prevent abuses and provide connement to possible exceptions, thus reducing
accesses that exploit the BtG principle. Denials are strictly enforced, meaning
that policies in P+ and exception policies in EP and EU can be evaluated if
and only if policies in P  do not apply or their evaluation is `false'. The main
goal of policies in P  is then to reduce the number of access requests evalu-
ated in the exception spaces EP and EU , also limiting cases in which malicious
users submit ad-hoc requests that break the glass. Policies in P  are specied
a priori for those unwanted accesses that can be foreseen at system setup, or
inserted a posteriori because of abuses observed through the analysis of audit
logs produced by accesses in EU . Note that all authorizations in P+ and P 
would have the form [any jsubject,object,action] (see Denition 5.1), where en-
vironment condition any indicates that they need to be considered for every
request.
Considering Example 3.1, Figure 2 shows a possible set of authorizations
in P+ and P . For the sake of clarity, eld env cond is omitted, since it is
assumed to be always equal to any. In our example, authorizations in P+ (P ,
respectively) are combined using operator + of our algebra.
6.2. Exception-Based Policies for Space EP
Space EP allows the denition of policies used to regulate requests that can-
not be considered `normal routine'. In healthcare, emergency requests include
all accesses necessary to preserve the health of the patients, but are inherently
dierent from normal routine. For instance, a nurse on duty can access medical
data of each patient entering the trauma ward.
In existing solutions, emergency requests fall in EU and are granted by break-
ing the glass. The main reason for dening authorizations within space EP is to
limit potential abuses of the BtG principle, by adequately regulating situations
that can be foreseen. Space EP contains permissions that extend P+ and are
applicable only when env cond evaluates to true, meaning that an exceptional
situation occurs. Like for policies in P+, also policies in EP do not override P .
An authorization in EP is formally dened as follows.
Denition 6.1 (Authorization in EP ). An authorization in EP has the
form [env condjsubject,object,action]  obligations, where subject, object, ac-
tion, and env cond are as in Denition 5.1, and eld obligations identies the
actions that must be performed if the access is granted.
An authorization [env condjsubject,object,action]  obligations states that
if env cond evaluates to true, subject can perform action on object, and obli-
gations must be enforced. Field obligations includes the actions that must
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Authorization Description
A1 [user.role=Nurse ^ user.startDuty<time() ^
user.endDuty>time(),
object.type=medical data ^ object.nurseId=user.id,
freadg]
A nurse on duty can read
the medical data of pa-
tients under her respon-
sibility
A2 [user.role=Doctor ^ user.startDuty<time() ^
user.endDuty>time(),
object.type=health record ^ object.doctorId=user.id,
any]
A doctor on duty can do
any action on the health
records of patients under
her responsibility
A3 [user.group=rstAidTeam,
object.type=health record ^ object.clinic=rstAid,
fread, writeg]
Users in the rst aid
team can read and write
the health record of pa-
tients that are in the
rst aid clinic
(a) P+
Authorization Description
N1 [user.group=medicalSta,
object.type=payment data,
freadg]
Users in the medical
sta cannot read the
payment data of patients
N2 [user.group=administrativeSta,
object.type=medical data,
fwrite,updateg]
Users in the administra-
tive sta cannot write or
modify the medical data
of patients
N3 [user.group=medicalSta,
object.type=health record ^ user.id2object.parents,
fwrite, updateg]
Users in the medi-
cal sta cannot write
or modify the health
records of their own
children
(b) P 
Figure 2: An example of authorizations in P+ (a) and P  (b)
be enforced after an access is granted [13]. Syntactically, a single obligation
is a term of the form predicate name(arguments), where arguments is a list,
possibly empty, of constant values or attributes. Examples of obligations are:
logging, auditing, and patient/supervisor notication. Similarly, policies in EP
extend Denition 5.2 with obligations.
At an abstract level, EP can be seen as space P+ for situations involv-
ing emergencies or in general exceptional situations. The key dierence to be
considered in the specication of EP is the denition of environment conditions.
The applicability of policies/authorizations in EP is therefore determined at run
time during the evaluation of each request and depends on the satisfaction of
env cond. Figure 3 shows, with reference to Example 3.1, three authorizations
composing policy space EP .
6.3. Exception-Based Policies for Space EU
The space of unplanned exceptions EU regulates those access requests that
are not evaluated against any policy in P+, P , and EP . In general, policies
in EU are assumed to be simple and always grant access according to the BtG
principle, since the promptness in reacting against exceptions is fundamental for
proper care delivery. In this scenario, a posteriori countermeasures (e.g., logging,
auditing) are used to identify potential abuses of the BtG principle. However,
they are only palliative, since the condentiality/integrity of the information
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env cond Rule (subject,object,action) Description
E1 state=emergency [user.role=Nurse ^
user.startDuty < time() ^
user.endDuty > time(),
object.type=medical data ^
object.nurseId6=user.id,
freadg] 
fill in form(privacyform)
A nurse on duty can read the
medical data of patients not un-
der her responsibility in case of
emergencies after lling in a pri-
vacy form
E2 state=emergency [user.role=Doctor ^
user.startDuty > time() ^
user.endDuty < time(),
object.type=medical data ^
object.doctorId 6=user.id,
any] -
A doctor on duty can do any ac-
tion on medical data of patients
not under her responsibility in
case of emergencies
E3 purpose=investigation [user.role=PoliceMan,
object.type=medical data,
freadg] 
notify(object.dataCollector)
A police man can read the medi-
cal data of each patient in case of
criminal investigation, notifying
the data collector (i.e., the hos-
pital)
Figure 3: An example of authorizations in EP
can be violated before taking countermeasures. For instance, if EU space is
composed of a single policy that grants all accesses it can be breached by simply
requesting an access that is neither granted by P+ or EP , nor denied by P .
Our solution is based on the idea that policies in EU should be adopted to
react to requests that happen in case of unplanned exceptions only. To limit
cases in which malicious users gain unauthorized accesses by presenting ad-
hoc requests that break the glass, we split EU in two policy sub-spaces: EU 
that forbids BtG under some specic environment conditions env cond, and
EU+ that implements BtG. EU  contains a set of authorizations of the form
[env condjsubject,object,any]  obligations that are checked rst and deny all
requests for which there is at least one authorization that applies to the re-
quest. EU+ contains a set of authorizations of the form [anyjsubject,object,any]
 obligations that enforce the BtG principle. Although EU  and EU+ could
be arbitrary sets of policies that may be activated according to specic condi-
tions on the environment state, for concreteness and x ideas we populate them
as follows: EU  = [state 6=\emergency"jany,any,any]  obligations and EU+ =
[anyjany,any,any]  obligations.
Obligations in spaces EU+ and EU  provide post-incident capabilities (i.e.,
auditing and logging [14]) that can be used a posteriori both for overseeing the
access requests in a given domain (e.g., a hospital department) and for better
redistributing policies among spaces.
All the access requests that fall in EU+ and EU  and directed to a set of
objects in a given domain are notied to a supervisor. Based on log les, the su-
pervisor takes countermeasures for misbehaving subjects or formalizes repeated
observed behaviors by dening additional policies in spaces P+, P , or EP .
Cross-domain activities should be managed in collaboration by dierent super-
visors, so to mitigate the risk of abuses by individual supervisors and of incorrect
policy specications. To better clarify audit functionality, suppose that an em-
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ployee of the hospital responsible for cleaning the surgical equipment reads the
type of patient disease to prepare the suitable cleaning protocol (as each in-
fectious disease has a dierent cleaning protocol). For each request submitted
by this employee and allowed in EU , the access is logged and an auditing pro-
cess must be performed. Since the request is admittable and should be always
allowed, a policy should be dened in P+ by the supervisor to regulate this sce-
nario. By contrast, suppose that a malicious employee, in addition to the type
of patient disease, also accesses the personal data of the patient to sell them to
an insurance company. In this case, the supervisor is able to apply remedies,
for example, initiating termination procedures and dening additional policies
in P  to avoid, in the future, similar unauthorized accesses.
7. Policy Evaluation and Enforcement
We now discuss how policies in policy spaces are evaluated and enforced.
Access requests are of the form huser id, action, object , purposesi, where
user id is the identier characterizing the requester, action is the action that is
being requested, object is the object on which the requester wishes to perform
the action, and purposes is the purpose (or set thereof) for which the access is
requested. We assume that the personal information of patients is collected for
a given purpose (e.g., providing patient care). In normal scenarios, data cannot
be used for any other purpose without the specic informed consent of the
patient it concerns, while in exception scenarios, restrictions to the purpose can
be expressed in env cond and used to evaluate the applicability of the policies.
The purpose of a request is also stored in log les, to possibly identify fraudulent
use of data and take adequate countermeasures.
When an access request is received, the sets of applicable policies in P+,
P , EP , and EU  are selected by evaluating environmental conditions env cond
using context information E and the information stored in the subject and
object proles. Authorization in EU+ is instead always applicable as a default
policy (i.e., permit all).
Figure 4 shows the policy evaluation ow, where each policy space is repre-
sented with a box that receives as input an access request and returns as output
an evaluation response. We assume that, for each of the spaces introduced, the
policy evaluation can result in three outcomes: i) true, positive evaluation; ii)
false, negative evaluation; iii) unknown, no applicable policy has been found.
Based on the response, the access request is granted, denied, or forwarded to
the next policy space.
The evaluation process works as follows. First, policies in P  are evaluated
against the access request. If the evaluation result is `true', the access is denied.
Otherwise, the request is redirected and evaluated against the set of applicable
policies in P+. If the evaluation result of policies in P+ is `true', the access
is granted. Otherwise, the request is redirected and evaluated in space EP of
planned exceptions. Like for policies in P+, if the evaluation is `true', the
access is granted, otherwise, the request falls in EU  . Note that the evaluation
of applicable policies must take into consideration complex policies and their
13
Figure 4: Policy evaluation ow
composition operators. As an example, let P = P1 & P2 be an applicable
policy, since the environment condition P .env cond is satised at request time.
The evaluation of P requires to examine the policies contained in it and to apply
the composition operator. In our example, P1 and P2 can be applicable or not
based on environment conditions P1.env cond and P2.env cond, respectively.
According to operator &, in case at least one of them has no eect (`false') or
is not applicable (`unknown'), the evaluation of P is `false'.
When a request is redirected to EU  , if the environment state of the request
is not critical, the access is denied. Otherwise, the access is granted in EU+ by
BtG, and the request is inserted into a log le. In both cases, the supervisor
receives a notication of the request and the result of the evaluation. The
supervisor is then able to perform a subsequent analysis to possibly individuate
abuses or access requests that should be regulated by the dening a proper set
of policies in spaces P+, P , or EP .
Example 7.1. Consider the MC hospital described in Example 3.1 and the poli-
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cies in Figures 2 and 3 that regulate the accesses to the MC's computer system.
Suppose now that Timothy, who is four-year old, is currently examined at the
MC hospital. Timothy was brought into MC's rst aid clinic by his mother,
Eva, late Wednesday evening. The admitting sta observed that Timothy suf-
fered from several contusions all over his body, a fractured rib, and a distorted
shoulder.
Let us walk through the events that would occur in this all too common sit-
uation.
Initially, Timothy's doctor in the rst aid clinic, Dr Murthy, takes a history,
lls in the electronic patient record, assigns the patient to a care team, and orders
a series of examinations. These actions are allowed since no policy in P  is
satised, while authorization A3 in Figure 2(a) evaluates to true. When the
examination results return, Dr Murthy suspects child abuse and initiates the
corresponding protocol setting the state as \critical".
As a consequence, the police and social services are informed of Timothy's
situation. Now, the police ocer responsible for the criminal investigation, Lt.
Starke, requires access to Timothy's medical information for purpose investiga-
tion. First, policies in P  are evaluated and, since the request is not an access
abuse, it evaluates to `false'. Then, the request is evaluated against policies in
P+ and EP (see Figure 2(a) and Figure 3). The request is not a normal practice
and then policies in P+ evaluate to false. Exception E3, instead, is applicable
based on the environment and evaluates to true. According to the discussion in
Section 6, access is allowed and Lt. Starke fullls the obligations by informing
MC of the access.
At the same time, the social worker responsible for helping abused kids re-
ported by MC's sta, Miss Woodrow, requests access to Timothy's health record.
Like for the case with Lt. Starke, the P  policies evaluate to `false' and the re-
quest is evaluated against applicable policies in P+ rst and EP then. However,
both the P+ and EP policy evaluation results in `unknown', since no authoriza-
tion is applicable. The request is then redirected to space EU  . As the state of
the patient is critical, access is forwarded to EU+ and granted to Miss Woodrow
who breaks the glass. The supervisor is then awakened and the audit process
starts. Since Miss Woodrow's access is common in case of child abuse, the su-
pervisor may dene an additional policy in EP to manage such a request in the
future and avoid further break the glass accesses.
Finally, suppose that Timothy's health deteriorates (and thus state is set to
\emergency") and Dr Murthy is not on duty. If the current doctor on duty,
Dr Wright, submits an access request to read Timothy's medical data, under
\emergency" situation, then the request falls in EP . Considering policies in
Figure 3, Dr Wright satises authorization E2 and accesses Timothy's medical
data.
8. Related Work
Although a number of projects and research works about access control
models and languages have been presented in the last few years [8, 10, 11,
15
15], only few proposals have attempted to provide a comprehensive framework
specically targeted to the healthcare scenario (e.g., [16]) and, in particular, to
the management of exceptions (e.g., [3, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]).
A work that shares our goal of assigning users higher privileges in case of
emergencies or critical situations is that of Gupta et al. [19], where the authors
present a criticality-aware access control model for pervasive applications and
smart environments. The proposed solution is based on the denition of roles,
ordered on the basis of their privileges, and on two access control modes (normal
and criticality-aware) that are activated on the basis of a criticality level. This
solution assigns a system role to each user on the basis of her responsibilities.
It then associates a space-role on the basis of the system roles and context
information. A promoterole function assigns space-roles with higher privileges to
the users when a critical event happens and the criticality-aware mode is entered.
A limitation of this solution with respect to our proposal is that it does not
provide a ne-grain control on when and who can exercise the \extra-privileges"
needed for taking care of an emergency situation. For instance, suppose that in
case of an emergency involving a patient aected by tuberculosis, only nurses
with a specialization in respiratory disorders should be permitted to read the
medical data of the patient to take the appropriate action. This situation cannot
be managed by the promoterole solution, where only the role of the user (i.e.,
\nurse") and the context information (i.e., \health emergency") are considered
to determine the promoted role (i.e., the role with `higher privileges'). It could
only be managed by creating ad-hoc roles, but this solution may result in an
unrestricted proliferation of roles.
Another important line of contribution focused on extending eXtensible Ac-
cess Control Markup Language (XACML) [10] with a new security and privacy
authorization prole [23], which fosters interoperability in the healthcare context
and introduces mechanisms to enforce authorization policies controlling access
to information, possibly stored across enterprise boundaries. This prole pro-
vides interoperability by oering common vocabularies and semantics for policy
request/response, policy lifecycle, and policy enforcement. It also includes def-
inition and evaluation of patient consent directives expressed as HL7 (Health
Level Seven International) condentiality codes, and integrates HL7 permission
codes that are associated with the users according to their roles. Several exam-
ples of use of this new prole show its suitability for the denition of policies in
healthcare scenarios, including the denition of policies in our spaces [24]. How-
ever, the proposed model mainly focuses on the denition of an infrastructure
for an interoperable, secure, privacy-oriented, and ne-grained access control,
but it does not consider the management of exceptions in emergency situations.
Although policies can be dened for emergency situations (and requests can
be tagged with an emergency purpose), they cannot regulate exceptions, BtG
scenarios, and security threats caused by unexpected events.
A dierent but related line of research is represented by Hippocratic
Databases (HDBs) [25]. HDBs are founded on ten principles: 1) purpose
specication; 2) respondents consent; 3) collection limitation; 4) use limited
to specied purposes; 5) limited disclosure; 6) limited retention; 7) accuracy;
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8) safety; 9) openness; and 10) compliance. Hippocratic Databases are used
in dierent contexts. First of all, they have been studied to limit the disclo-
sure of sensitive information and provide ne-grained access control [26]. Also,
they provide specic mechanisms allowing data owners to audit (a posteriori) if
the releases of their information are compliant with the declared purposes [27].
Finally, Hippocratic Databases have been adopted in the healthcare scenario
(e.g., [28, 29, 30]). These solutions address the problem of dening a system
compliant with privacy and security laws, providing audit functionality. Both
the proposals in [28, 29] address this problem by combining query re-writing,
for access control enforcement, and HDB compliance auditing systems. These
proposals adopting HDBs in the healthcare scenario are aimed to the protection
of medical data when sensitive information is released to third parties, with a
purpose dierent from \delivery of care". As a consequence, these solutions
do not support the BtG principle and exception management that we capture
through the denition of dierent policy spaces.
9. Conclusions
In healthcare, nothing should interfere with the delivery of care. Solutions
based on the break the glass principle are usually adopted to subvert access
control decisions in emergency situations. The break the glass scenario, how-
ever, represents a backdoor for malicious users that try to gain unauthorized
accesses. In this paper, we presented an exception-based access control solution
whose main goal is to better control the break the glass attempts in healthcare
systems, to reduce possible breaches in the patients' privacy. To this aim, we
introduced the denition of policy spaces that balance the rigorous nature of
traditional access control systems with the delivery of care comes rst principle.
We illustrated how policies are specied and enforced within each space, and
how these policy spaces are composed by means of an algebra.
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